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The USPTO’s Historic Struggle with Markush Claims: Will the 2011 
Guidelines Provide Relief? 
Kimberly J. Prior 
I. Introduction  
Historically, United States Patent and Trademark Office (the “Patent Office”) policy 
prohibited reciting elements in a patent claim in the alternative, i.e. A, B or C.
1
  Even so, in the 
chemical arts, applicants commonly claimed chemical compounds in terms of a chemical core 
structure containing optional substituents designated by a generic “R” group, defined as a list of 
alternatives in the claims.
2
   
Where an application described different alternative embodiments, the Patent Office 
required each alternative to be claimed in a different application.
3
  In Ex parte Eagle,
4
 applicant 
disclosed a box in combination with a number of different followers and provided a generic 
claim encompassing the various embodiments.
5
  The examiner rejected the claims on the basis 
that only one of the disclosed embodiments could be claimed in a given application.
6
  The 
Commissioner of Patents held that this rejection was in error and that applicant could claim a 
genus encompassing all of the species.
7
  Thus, the Patent Office confirmed that generic claims 
                                                 
1
 Examination of Patent Applications that Include Claims Containing Alternative Language, 72 
Fed. Reg. 44,992, 44,992 (proposed August 10, 2007, never enacted). 
2
 HAROLD C. WEGNER, THE EAGLE RIGHT TO GENERIC PROTECTION, ATTACHED TO AUGUST 10, 
2007, TESTIMONY IN RESPONSE TO EXAMINATION OF PATENT APPLICATIONS THAT INCLUDE 
CLAIMS CONTAINING ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE, 72 FED. REG. 44,992, § II-A-2 (discussing the 
origins of chemical Markush practice). 
3
 Id. at § II-A-1. 
4
 Ex parte Eagle, 1870 C.D. 137 (Comm’r Dec. 1870). 
5
 Id. at 137. 
6
 Id. at 137. 
7
 Id. at 137. 
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covering independent and distinct embodiments are permissible.
8
 
In 1924, the Commissioner of Patents decided Ex parte Markush,
9
 holding where no 
generic expression exists by which a group of alternative elements can be claimed applicants are 
permitted to recite the elements in the alternative.
10
  In Ex parte Markush, applicant’s original 
claims recited the individual embodiments of the invention, the examiner objected to applicant’s 
claims as being alternative.
11
  When applicant amended the claims to use a generic term, they 
were rejected as unpatentable over art.
12
  In response, the claims were ultimately rewritten using 
the phrase “material selected from the group consisting of aniline, homologues of aniline and 
halogen substitutes of aniline.”13  The examiner maintained the alternative claim rejection, but 
the Commissioner of Patents reversed, finding a truly generic term covers more than one 
element, and so there should be no objection to claiming those same elements with different 
language.
14
 
Today, an applicant generally may use any type of language, including alternative 
expressions to claim his invention, so long as the meaning of the claim is clear.
15
  The Patent 
Office accepts recitation of a Markush group either by using the language from Ex parte 
                                                 
8
 Id. at 137. 
9
 Ex parte Markush, 1925 C.D. 126 (Comm’r Dec. 1924)(originally reported at 340 O.G. 839). 
10
 Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 803.02 (8
th
 ed., Rev. 5, Aug. 2006).  Manual of 
Patent Examining Procedure will hereinafter be abbreviated M.P.E.P. as is commonly used in 
patent practice.  The most current version of the M.P.E.P. is the 8
th
 edition, revision 8, published 
July 2010.  In examining the evolution of Patent Office Policy related to Markush practice, the 
specific revision of the manual discussing the point made will be cited.   
11
 Ex parte Markush, 1925 C.D. at 127. 
12
 Id. at 127. 
13
 Id. at 127. 
14
 Id. at 128. 
15
 M.P.E.P. § 2173.01 (8
th
 ed., Rev. 6, Sept. 2007). 
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Markush, “wherein R is selected from the group consisting of A, B, and C,” or alternative 
language, “wherein R is A, B, or C.”16  
The members of a Markush group “ordinarily must belong to a recognized physical or 
chemical class or to an art recognized class.”17  However, “[w]here a Markush expression is 
applied only to a portion of a chemical compound, the propriety of the grouping is determined by 
a consideration of the compounds as a whole, and does not depend on there being a community 
of properties in the members of the Markush expression.”18 
Since the Markush decision, the use of so-called Markush-type claims has grown, 
particularly in the chemical and biotechnological arts, resulting in ever increasing challenges for 
examination of such claims by the Patent Office.
19
  However, this practice has resulted in claims 
of increasing scope and complexity.
20
  It is not unusual for chemical cases to contain a claim that 
is several pages in length and includes thousands of compounds.
21
  The complexity of such 
claims is directly proportional to the number of alternative embodiments they encompass.
22
   
The Patent Office has expressed frustration over applicant’s filing of such claims.  In 
particular, one of the Patent Office’s concerns is that broad Markush-type claims require a 
disproportionate amount of Examiner time and Patent Office resources as compared to simpler 
claims containing a single embodiment or small number of alternatives.
23
  Another of the Patent 
Office’s concerns is that separate search and examination of each of the alternatives is often 
                                                 
16
 Id. § 2173.05(h). 
17
 Id. § 2173.05(h). 
18
 Id. § 2173.05(h). 
19
 Examination of Patent Applications that Include Claims Containing Alternative Language, 72 
Fed. Reg. 44,992, 44,994 (proposed August 10, 2007, never enacted). 
20
 Id. at 44,992. 
21
 Id. at 44,992. 
22
 See, e.g., Id. at 44,994. 
23
 Id. at 44,992. 
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necessary because different alternatives often raise different patentability issues.
24
  This increase 
in the number and complexity of applications containing Markush claims has contributed to an 
increase in prosecution pendency,
25
 an ongoing battle for the Patent Office. 
Since section 121
26
 was introduced in the Patent Act of 1952, the Patent Office has 
adopted several approaches to facilitate examination of applications containing Markush claims.  
The first three of these approaches have failed to provide a workable solution for examination of 
Markush-type claims.  The first of these approaches, rejection of such claims under 35 U.S.C. § 
121 as misjoinder and as an improper Markush group,
27
 failed due to court decisions holding 
these rejections improper.  The second of these approaches, intra-claim restriction
28
 has failed 
because the size and complexity of Markush-type claims is outpacing the Patent Office’s ability 
to examine them.
29
  The third of these approaches, the proposed Alternative Claims Rules,
30
 was 
never adopted by the Patent Office probably because the many negative public comments.
31
   
                                                 
24
 Id. at 44,992. 
25
 Id. at 44,992. 
26
 35 U.S.C. § 121 (1999).  If two or more independent and distinct inventions are claimed in one 
application, the Director may require the application to be restricted to one of the inventions. If 
the other invention is made the subject of a divisional application, which complies with the 
requirements of section 120 of this title it shall be entitled to the benefit of the filing date of the 
original application. A patent issuing on an application with respect to which a requirement for 
restriction under this section has been made, or on an application filed as a result of such a 
requirement, shall not be used as a reference either in the Patent and Trademark Office or in the 
courts against a divisional application or against the original application or any patent issued on 
either of them, if the divisional application is filed before the issuance of the patent on the other 
application. If a divisional application is directed solely to subject matter described and claimed 
in the original application as filed, the Director may dispense with signing and execution by the 
inventor. The validity of a patent shall not be questioned for failure of the Director to require the 
application to be restricted to one invention. 
27
 In re Weber, 580 F.2d 455 (C.C.P.A. 1978), footnote 3; and Practice Re Markush-type Claims, 
922 O.G. 1016 (May 1, 1974). 
28
 M.P.E.P. § 803.02 (8
th
 ed., Rev. 5, August 2006). 
29
 Examination of Patent Applications that Include Claims Containing Alternative Language, 72 
Fed. Reg. at 44,994. 
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The Patent Office adopted its latest approach in the Supplementary 112 Guidelines,
32
 
effective February 9, 2011.  The new Guidelines provide for rejection of Markush claims under 
certain circumstances.  As examiners begin to apply these Guidelines, applicants are likely to 
appeal the rejections.  While it remains to be seen how successful the new Guidelines will be in 
easing the Patent Office’s burden of examining applications containing Markush-type claims, it 
is possible that applicant challenges will result in court decisions, which like the Patent Office’s 
early approach, frustrates the Patent Office’s efforts. 
This paper explores the various approaches previously applied by the Patent Office to 
handle examination of Markush claims, possible challenges under the new Guidelines, and 
whether the Guidelines are likely to be successful in easing the Patent Office’s burden or result 
in an even greater burden on examiners.  
                                                                                                                                                             
30
 Examination of Patent Applications that Include Claims Containing Alternative Language, 72 
Fed. Reg. 44,992, 44,992 (proposed August 10, 2007, never enacted). 
31
 See, generally, JAPAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ASSOCIATION COMMENTS (OCTOBER 5, 2007) 
ON EXAMINATION OF PATENT APPLICATIONS THAT INCLUDE CLAIMS CONTAINING ALTERNATIVE 
LANGUAGE, 72 FED. REG. 44,992; BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION COMMENTS 
(OCTOBER 9, 2007) ON EXAMINATION OF PATENT APPLICATIONS THAT INCLUDE CLAIMS 
CONTAINING ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE, 72 FED. REG. 44,992; NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH 
COMMENTS (OCTOBER 9, 2007) ON EXAMINATION OF PATENT APPLICATIONS THAT INCLUDE 
CLAIMS CONTAINING ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE, 72 FED. REG. 44,992; THE NATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION OF PATENT PRACTITIONERS COMMENTS (OCTOBER 9, 2007) ON EXAMINATION OF 
PATENT APPLICATIONS THAT INCLUDE CLAIMS CONTAINING ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE, 72 FED. 
REG. 44,992; SAN DIEGO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION COMMENTS (OCTOBER 9, 
2007) ON EXAMINATION OF PATENT APPLICATIONS THAT INCLUDE CLAIMS CONTAINING 
ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE, 72 FED. REG. 44,992; AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
ASSOCIATION COMMENTS (OCTOBER 15, 2007) ON EXAMINATION OF PATENT APPLICATIONS THAT 
INCLUDE CLAIMS CONTAINING ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE, 72 FED. REG. 44,992; INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY OWNERS ORGANIZATION COMMENTS (OCTOBER 15, 2007) ON EXAMINATION OF 
PATENT APPLICATIONS THAT INCLUDE CLAIMS CONTAINING ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE, 72 FED. 
REG. 44,992. 
32
 Supplementary Guidelines for Determining Compliance with 35 U.S.C. 112 and for Treatment 
of Related Issues in Patent Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 7,162 (February 9, 2011). 
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II. The Patent Office’s Approaches to Examination of Markush Claims 
A. Rejection of Markush Claims as Misjoinder and as an Improper Markush 
Grouping under 35 U.S.C.  121:  An Early Approach 
Section 121 of the Patent Act of 1952 allows the Patent Office to restrict a patent 
application claiming two or more independent and distinct inventions to one of those inventions 
provided that it allows applicant to claim the additional subject matter in additional 
applications.
33
  In the early 1970s, the Patent Office developed an approach to examination of 
Markush claims and published its new guidelines in the Official Gazette.
34
  The Patent Office 
asserted that a Markush-type claim was directed to independent and distinct inventions where 
“two or more of its members are so unrelated and diverse that a prior art reference anticipating 
the claim with respect to one of the members would not render the claim obvious under 35 
U.S.C. 103 with respect to the other member(s).” 35   Under this approach, examiners were 
authorized to reject a claim containing such independent and distinct inventions as an improper 
Markush claim and for misjoinder under 35 U.S.C. § 121.  The examiner was further authorized 
to require applicant to limit his application to one of these inventions.
36
  It is clear this 
authorization provided both for “intra-claim” restriction between groups the examiner believed 
to be independent and distinct inventions and for a requirement that applicant amend his claims 
to recite only the elected inventions.
37
  This policy was a change from the previous practice of 
restricting only between separate claims.
38
 
                                                 
33
 35 U.S.C. § 121 (1999). 
34
 In re Weber, 580 F.2d 455 (C.C.P.A. 1978), footnote 3; and Practice Re Markush-type Claims, 
922 O.G. 1016 (May 1, 1974). 
35
 M.P.E.P. § 803 (3
rd
 ed., Rev. 45, July 1975). 
36
 Id. 
37
 Id. 
38
 See, HAROLD C. WEGNER, THE EAGLE RIGHT TO GENERIC PROTECTION, ATTACHED TO AUGUST 
10, 2007, TESTIMONY IN RESPONSE TO EXAMINATION OF PATENT APPLICATIONS THAT INCLUDE 
CLAIMS CONTAINING ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE, 72 FED. REG. 44,992, § III-A at 9-10.   
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Applicants challenged the Patent Office’s policy through appeal of the improper Markush 
and misjoinder rejections.  The leading cases on such challenges are In re Weber
39
 and In re 
Haas.
40
  In Weber, applicant claimed cyclic diamine derivatives having psychotherapeutic 
effectiveness.
41
  The compounds were claimed in Markush format
42
 and, although of modest 
scope today, were of moderate breadth for the time.  The examiner rejected the claims on two 
separate bases: (1) being improper Markush claims and (2) misjoinder under 35 U.S.C. § 121.  
These rejections were in accordance with the Patent Office policy of the time, allowing rejection 
where a Markush claim is directed to “independent and distinct inventions.”43  This rejection is 
reminiscent of that made in Ex parte Eagle found to be proper as far back as 1870. 
The Board of Patent Appeals affirmed the examiner’s rejections but did not consider 
them separately, instead considering them together as one rejection.
44
  The United States Court 
of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) did not address the propriety of the improper Markush 
rejection.  Instead, it remanded this rejection to the board, but cautioned the board that its 
decision on reconsideration must be consistent with the court’s “analysis of applicant’s rights 
under the second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112.”45  The court then addressed the rejection for 
misjoinder under § 121. 
The court confirmed its previous decision that 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, allows 
an inventor to claim the invention as he contemplates it,
46
 employing those limitations he 
considers necessary to circumscribe the invention so long as the application complies with 35 
                                                 
39
 In re Weber, 580 F.2d 455 (C.C.P.A. 1978). 
40
 In re Haas, 580 F.2d 461 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (Haas II). 
41
 In re Weber at. 456. 
42
 See, Id. 
43
 Id. at footnote 3. 
44
 Id. at 458. 
45
 Id. 
46
 Id. (citing In re Wolfrum, 486 F.2 588 (C.C.P.A. 1973). 
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U.S.C. § 112.
47
  The court held that “an applicant has a right to have each claim examined on the 
merits.”48  It found that while the Patent Office may properly restrict between separate claims of 
an application without affecting applicant’s rights, if the Patent Office divides a single claim, 
requiring it to be presented in several applications, the claim as a whole would never be 
considered on its merits.
49
  This is because “the resulting fragmentary claims would not 
necessarily be the equivalent of the original claim.”50  The court further recognized that where 
the Patent Office divides a single claim, two problems under 35 U.S.C. § 112 could result.
51
  
First, the resulting subgenera “would be defined by the examiner rather than by the applicant” in 
violation of § 112, second paragraph.
52
  Second, some of the fragments created by such division 
may not be described by the specification in violation of § 112, first paragraph.
53
 
The court went on to clarify that while § 121 allows the Patent Office to “restrict an 
application to one of several claimed inventions” where the inventions are “independent and 
distinct,” it does not allow an examiner “to reject a particular claim on that same basis.”54  The 
court recognized that the Patent Office must have the ability to control its workflow, but held 
that an applicant’s “statutory rights are paramount” and that “a rejection under § 121 violates the 
basic right of the applicant to claim his invention as he chooses.”55 
On the same day it decided Weber, the CCPA considered the same issues in the case of In 
                                                 
47
 Id. 
48
 Id. 
49
 Id. 
50
 Id. 
51
 Id. 
52
 Id. 
53
 Id. 
54
 Id. 
55
 Id. at 458-59. 
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re Haas (Haas II).
56
  The claims in Haas II were directed to benzoyl peroxide compounds having 
reactive groups attached to the benzene rings.
57
  The reactive groups were defined using 
Markush language.
58
  The compounds shared a common utility as reactants for the preparation of 
a particular type of polymers.
59
  As in Weber, the court found that 35 U.S.C. § 121 cannot be a 
basis for rejecting a claim.
60
   
Five years earlier, the CCPA initially considered the Haas application in Haas I.
61
  The 
issue in Haas I was whether refusal of the Patent Office to examine a Markush-type claim 
subsequent to an “intra-claim” restriction requirement on the basis that it contained independent 
and distinct inventions was tantamount to a rejection.
62
  The import of the answer is that a 
substantive rejection is reviewable by the Board of Patent Appeals, while a restriction 
requirement is purely administrative and outside the jurisdiction of the board.
63
  In Haas I, the 
court held that the Patent Office’s actions were in effect a rejection because the “claims were 
withdrawn from consideration not only in this application but prospectively in any subsequent 
application because their content,”64 which was essentially a denial of the claims’ patentability.65    
The court further noted that “only by dividing the subject matter into separate, and thus different, 
claims in plural application could an examination of the patentability of their subject matter be 
obtained.” 66 
                                                 
56
 In re Haas, 580 F.2d 461 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (Haas II). 
57
 Id. at 462. 
58
 See, Id. 
59
 Id. 
60
 Id. at 464. 
61
 In re Haas, 486 F.2d 1053 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (Haas I). 
62
 See Id. at 1054, 1056. 
63
 Id. at 1054. 
64
 Id. at 1056. 
65
 Id. 
66
 Id. 
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Thus, Weber, Haas I, and Haas II made it clear that rejection of a claim under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 121 is improper and that “intra-claim” restriction of a Markush claim is actually a rejection of 
the claim under § 121 because it is a refusal to examine the claim.
67
  Because each of these 
decisions subsumed the improper Markush rejections within the rejections under § 121, they 
leave open the question of whether it is proper to reject a claim as constituting an improper 
Markush claim solely on the basis that it contains independent and distinct inventions. 
Two years later, the CCPA again addressed the propriety of an improper Markush 
rejection in In re Harnisch.
68
 The claimed invention encompassed coumarin compounds that 
were useful as dyestuffs.
69
  The compounds were claimed in Markush format.
70
  As in Weber, the 
examiner rejected the claims under 35 U.S.C. § 121 on the combined bases that they contained 
an improper Markush group and for misjoinder.
71
  The examiner followed the guidelines set 
forth by the Commissioner in the 1974 Official Gazette Notice,
72
 arguing both that the claims 
were independent and distinct and that search and examination of the entire claim would be a 
serious burden.
73
 
On appeal, the Board of Patent Appeals reversed the rejection under § 121 in accordance 
with the CCPA decisions in Weber and Haas.  However, the board made a new rejection “under 
37 C.F.R. § 1.196(b),
74
 rejecting the claims as ‘drawn to improper Markush groups.’”75  The 
                                                 
67
 See, In re Haas, 486 F.2d 1053, 1056 (C.C.P.A. 1973), In re Weber, 580 F.2d 455, 458 
(C.C.P.A.  1978), In re Haas, 580 F.2d 461, 464 (C.C.P.A. 1978). 
68
 In re Harnisch, 631 F.2d 716 (C.C.P.A. 1980). 
69
 Id. at 716. 
70
 See, Id. at 716-17. 
71
 Id. at 717. 
72
 In re Weber, 580 F.2d 455, 456 (C.C.P.A. 1978); Footnote 3 (discussing the Official Gazette 
Notice at 922 O.G. 1016 issued by the Commissioner May 1, 1974). 
73
 In re Harnisch, 631 F.2d 716, 717 (C.C.P.A. 1980). 
74
 37 C.F.R. § 1.196(b) (1989).  Should the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences have 
knowledge of any grounds not involved in the appeal for rejecting any appealed claim, it may 
  11 
board did not rely on a statutory basis for its rejection.
76
  Instead, it extensively reviewed 
previous Markush decisions and based its rejection solely on the “judicially created doctrine” of 
improper Markush grouping.
77
  This appears to be the beginning of the Patent Office’s reliance 
on an improper Markush rejection as being “judicially created.”  The board found “that the 
members of the Markush groups . . . do not belong to a known or recognized genus and possess 
widely different physical or chemical properties.”78  The board then found that “[t]he mere fact 
that there is a single structural similarity is not in itself sufficient reason to render all the 
embodiments functionally equivalent, particularly when the ultimate properties of the final 
products would not be expected to possess any recognized functional relationships,”79 holding 
that even though all of the compounds were disclosed as dyestuffs, they were not functionally 
equivalent.”80 
The CCPA held that there is no judicially created “Markush doctrine” and that no single 
rule exists with regard to Markush practice.
81
  In fact the Patent Office had, and still does have, 
two different practices depending on whether the claims are directed to compounds or to 
processes or compositions employing a combination of steps or ingredients, respectively.
82
  The 
court confirmed that each case must be considered on its own facts and, for the first time, defined 
                                                                                                                                                             
include in the decision a statement to that effect with its reasons for so holding, which statement 
shall constitute a new rejection of the claims.  A new rejection shall not be considered final for 
the purposes of judicial review.   
75
 In re Harnisch, 631 F.2d 716, 717 (C.C.P.A. 1980) 
76
 Id. at 718. 
77
 Id.  
78
 Id. 
79
 Id. 
80
 Id.  
81
 Id. at 719. 
82
 Id. at 720. 
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the issue of a proper Markush group as an issue of “unity of invention.”83   
In In re Jones,
84
 the CCPA established that “in determining the propriety of a Markush 
grouping, the compounds must be considered as wholes and not broken down into elements or 
other components.”85  In Harnisch, the court found that the board erred in holding that the 
compounds did not possess a common function as all of the claimed compounds were disclosed 
as dyes.
86
  Further, all of the compounds were coumarin compounds and thus had a “single 
structural similarity.” 87  The court held that the “compounds all belong to a subgenus, as defined 
by appellant, which is not repugnant to scientific classification.” 88  Thus, the court held that the 
claims possessed unity of invention and constituted a proper Markush group.
89
  The decision 
appears to leave open the possibility that an improper Markush rejection might be available 
where the group of compounds either do not share a common function or do not have some 
structural similarity that would define a group that is not repugnant to one having ordinary skill 
in the art. 
After Harnisch, the Board of Appeals and Interferences considered an improper Markush 
rejection in Ex parte Hozumi.
90
  The claims were directed to “phosphoric acid diesters in which 
one esterifying moiety is derived from a poly(ethylene glycol) monoether and the other is 
derived from a beta-aminoethanol,” 91  and all of the compounds were disclosed as having 
                                                 
83
 Id. at 721. 
84
 In re Jones, 162 F.2d 479 (C.C.P.A. 1947). 
85
 In re Harnisch at 722 (citing In re Jones, 162 F.2d 479 (C.C.P.A. 1947). 
86
 Id. 
87
 Id. 
88
 Id.  
89
 Id. 
90
 Ex parte Hozumi, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1059 (B.P.A.I. 1984). 
91
 Id. 
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antimycotic activity.
92
  The board held that the compounds contained “a substantial structural 
feature of the class of compounds claimed and disclosed as being essential to at least one 
disclosed utility.”93  Further, the board found that the compounds had unity of invention because 
there was “a relatively large proportion of the structure of the compounds in the claimed class 
which is common to the entire class.”94   
The decision purports to follow guidelines set forth in Harnisch.
95
  However, the board’s 
decision establishes two requirements for a proper Markush claim that appear nowhere in 
Harnisch.  The first of these is the concept that the common physical or structural feature of the 
compounds must be “a substantial structural feature.”96   The second is that this substantial 
structural feature must be essential to a disclosed utility.
97
  These two concepts have become a 
hallmark of the Patent Office’s approaches to examination of Markush claims.98 
B.  Restriction Practice – Election of a Single Disclosed Species:  The Longstanding 
Approach 
After the CCPA decisions in Weber, Haas II, and Harnisch, and the board’s decision in 
Hozumi, the Patent Office changed approach.  It recognized the futility of rejecting claims as 
                                                 
92
 Id. 
93
 Id. 
94
 Id. 
95
 Id. 
96
 Id. 
97
 Id. 
98
 See, M.P.E.P. § 803.02 (8
th
 ed., Rev. 5, Aug. 2006); Examination of Patent Applications that 
Include Claims Containing Alternative Language, 72 Fed. Reg. 44,992, 44,994 (August 10, 
2007).  Compare, Supplementary Guidelines for Determining Compliance with 35 U.S.C. 112 
and for Treatment of Related Issues in Patent Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 7,162, 7,166 (February 
9, 2011) which states “A Markush claim contains an ‘improper Markush grouping’ if: (1) The 
species of the Markush group do not share a ‘single structural similarity,’ or (2) the species do 
not share a common use.  Members of a Markush group share a ‘single structural similarity’ 
when they belong to the same recognized physical or chemical class or to the same art-
recognized class.  Members of a Markush group share a common use when they are disclosed in 
the specification or known in the art to be functionally equivalent.” (citations omitted). 
  14 
improper Markush claims whether under 35 U.S.C. § 121 or based on judicial precedent.
99
  
Although the Patent Office has long indicated that an “improper Markush” rejection could be 
made, the latest revision of the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (M.P.E.P.)
100
 does not 
even discuss making such rejections.  The Patent Office further recognized there was an 
approach that could avoid judicial review.  The CCPA, in Weber, acknowledged the Patent 
Office’s need for latitude in controlling administrative matters so long as its actions did not 
impinge upon applicants’ statutory rights.101  Additionally, in Haas I, the CCPA acknowledged 
that while rejections were appealable, restriction requirements were administrative and outside 
the jurisdiction of the board
102
 and thus the courts.  As a result, the Patent Office abandoned its 
rejection of Markush claims and continued its practice of restricting within a Markush claim, 
adopting an election of species practice.
103
 
The Patent Office’s policy with regard to restriction of Markush claims is set forth in 
Chapter 800 of the M.P.E.P.
104
  Prior to the Weber and the Haas I and Haas II decisions, this 
policy instructed the examiner to restrict a Markush claim he believed to contain multiple 
‘independent and distinct inventions,’ to a single invention.105  In restricting, the examiner was 
instructed to “(1) clearly delineate the members or groups of members believed to constitute 
improperly joined inventions, and (2) state reasons fully explaining why they are independent 
and distinct.”106  It is clear from these instructions that the Patent Office’s intent was an intra-
                                                 
99
 See, e.g., M.P.E.P. § 803 (4
th
 ed., Rev. 0, June 1979)(stating that revision of the section was 
due to the decisions in Haas and Weber). 
100
 M.P.E.P. §§ 802-803 (8
th
 ed., Rev. 5, Aug. 2006). 
101
 In re Weber, 580 F.2d 455, 458-59 (C.C.P.A. 1978). 
102
 In re Haas, 486 F.2d 1053, 1054 (C.C.P.A. 1973). 
103
 M.P.E.P. § 803 (4
th
 ed., Rev. 0, June 1979). 
104
 M.P.E.P. § 800 (8
th
 Ed., Rev. 8, July 2010).   
105
 M.P.E.P. § 803 (3
rd
 ed., Rev. 45, July 1975). 
106
 Id. 
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claim restriction in which each delineated group contained subject matter the examiner believed 
was independent and distinct from the subject matter of each other group.  Patent Office policy 
also stated that, “Applicant’s response to such a requirement should be an election of a single 
adequately disclosed and supported invention, with or without restriction of the claim(s) to that 
invention.”107   The examiner was instructed to maintain the restriction requirement and not 
examine any claims that were not limited to the elected invention.
108
  Thus, Patent Office policy 
was to refuse examination of any subject matter it believed independent and distinct from the 
elected subject matter, even where the subject matter is present in a single Markush claim.
109
 
Following the decisions in Weber and Haas II, these instructions were removed from the 
M.P.E.P.
110
  The Patent Office revised its practice in view of the CCPA’s decisions.111  The 
revised practice requires an examiner to examine “all of the members of the Markush group in 
the claim on the merits, even though they may be directed to independent and distinct 
inventions”112 where “the members of the Markush group are sufficiently few in number or so 
closely related that a search and examination of the entire claim can be made without serious 
burden.”113   However, it is rare that today’s Markush claims contain embodiments that are 
closely related and few in number for this practice to be followed.
114
  Instead, the vast majority 
of chemical and biotechnological patent applications are restricted.
115
  Where claims are too 
                                                 
107
 Id. 
108
 Id. 
109
 Id. 
110
 M.P.E.P. § 803 (3
rd
 ed., Rev. 56, July 1978). 
111
 M.P.E.P. § 803 (4
th
 ed. Rev. 0, June 1979). 
112
 Id. 
113
 Id. 
114
 See, Examination of Patent Applications that Include Claims Containing Alternative 
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broad or complex to be examined as presented and considered to “encompasses at least two 
independent and distinct inventions, the examiner may require a provisional election of a single 
species prior to examination on the merits.”116  The examiner should then fully examine the 
elected species and any other species that are not patentably distinct from the elected species.
117
  
If the claim is not allowable, the claim is rejected and the patentably distinct, nonelected species 
are withdrawn from consideration.
118
  If, however, the elected species is found allowable, 
examination of the Markush claim then is to be extended to the extent necessary to determine 
patentability of the Markush claim.
119
  These basic instructions to examiners have not changed 
since 1979.
120
  However, what has changed is the Patent Office’s approach to what constitutes an 
independent and distinct invention. 
In May 1988, the Patent Office separated the procedure for restricting Markush claims 
into section 803.02 of the M.P.E.P.
121
 and added a single paragraph that has had significant 
import to the restriction of such claims.
122
  This new paragraph cites to the Weber, Haas II, 
Harnisch, and Hozumi decisions and states in pertinent part that “[s]ince the decisions in In re 
Weber et. al. and In re Haas, it is improper for the Office to refuse to examine that which 
applicants regard as their invention, unless the subject matter in a claim lacks unity of 
invention.”123 (emphasis added).  “Broadly, unity of invention exists where compounds included 
within a Markush group (1) share a common utility and (2) share a substantial structural feature 
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disclosed as being essential to that utility.”124  
This added paragraph misinterprets the cited decisions and creates a greater burden on 
applicant than any established by the court.  Weber and Haas II each held that 35 U.S.C. § 121 
was not a proper basis for rejecting claim.
125
  The only reference to restriction in these cases was 
Weber’s recognition of the Patent Office’s need to control its workload.126  However, the court 
specifically held that where the Patent Office’s actions conflicted with applicant’s statutory 
rights, applicant’s rights are dominant. 127  Further, these decisions must be considered in light of 
the CCPA’s holding in Haas I.  In that case, the court held that withdrawal of a subject matter 
within a claim through restriction was synonymous with rejecting the claim because it prevented 
applicant from ever having his claim as presented examined.
128
  Thus, Haas I found that 
restriction of subject matter within a claim was essentially a rejection of the claim, and Weber 
and Haas II found that rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 121 is improper.  The Weber and Haas 
decisions did not hold that a refusal to examine that which applicants regard as their invention 
was improper unless the subject matter in a claim lacks unity of invention, but that a refusal to 
examine that which applicants regard as their invention and have claimed in a single claim is 
improper.  Thus, it would appear these decisions foreclose restriction within a Markush claim, 
and yet it has been standard practice to require restriction, through election of species practice at 
least since 1988.
129
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This leaves Harnisch and Hozumi which are cited for the proposition that unity of 
invention exists where compounds included within a Markush group (1) share a common utility 
and (2) share a substantial structural feature disclosed as being essential to that utility.”130  The 
M.P.E.P. does not provide any additional instructions to the examiner with regard to unity of 
invention.  However, the clear implication is that where the members of a Markush group do not 
have a common utility or do not share a substantial structural feature that is disclosed as being 
essential to that utility the claim lacks unity of invention.  The first issue with this position is that 
both Harnisch and Hozumi found the claims were proper Markush groups having a common 
utility and a common structural feature.
131
  These decisions did not, however, hold that this is the 
only way in which a claim can be found to be a proper Markush claim.  In fact, they found that 
each case must be considered upon its own facts.
132
  Another issue is that although the Board of 
Patent Appeals and Interferences in Hozumi found that the members of the claims at issue shared 
a substantial structural feature that was essential to the disclosed common utility, Harnisch found 
only that there was a common utility and a common single structural feature.
133
  There was no 
requirement that the structural feature be “substantial” or that it be “essential” to the compounds 
utility. 
As noted by the court in Haas I,
134
 restriction requirements are outside the jurisdiction of 
the board and courts.
135
  Therefore, the Patent Office’s switch from rejection of the claims to 
restriction practice has forestalled development of these issues through appellate review.  
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Although the above election of species procedure was the official Patent Office policy 
until adoption of the new Guidelines
136
 discuss in section II-D infra.  There are in reality two 
separate restriction practices that occur in the Patent Office, particularly in Technology Center 
1600, with regard to Markush claims.  Some examiners essentially follow the official practice.  
Some examiners strictly follow this policy,
137
 while others refuse to extend the search when the 
elected species is allowable, object to the claims as containing nonelected subject matter, and 
require applicants to cancel that subject matter to obtain allowance.  Because the claims are 
subject to an objection rather than to a rejection, applicants have no right of appeal.
138
  The only 
recourse is to file a petition,
139
 which Applicants may be reluctant to do with allowable subject 
matter indicated. 
The second procedure followed by some examiners is to restrict within a single claim to 
create several groups of subgenera.
140
  For example, the examiner may divide the claims as 
follows: 
Group I:  Claims 1 to 5, directed to compounds of formula I where R is heteroaryl,  
Group II: Claims 1 to 5, directed to compounds of formula I where R is aryl, 
Group III:  Claims 1 to 5, directed to compounds of formula I where R is cycloalkyl. 
The examiner then proceeds to examine only the elected group.  When the elected invention 
becomes allowable, the examiner objects to the claims and requires cancellation of the 
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nonelected subject matter.
141
   
Both of these processes can result in several patentability issues for the patent applicant.  
One of the most severe issues is that the claims ultimately allowed may not be fully supported by 
the specification.
142
  Even though the original broad claim scope was fully supported by the 
specification, the ultimate narrower scope may not be supported.  This situation can occur 
because the narrower claim is usually defined, not by the applicant, but by the examiner.
143
  
Additionally, even if the claims that issue in the original application are supported, the remaining 
nonelected subject matter may not find support, preventing applicant’s ability to receive a patent 
to the remaining subject matter in a divisional application.
144
  
Another issue raised by current restriction practice is that where the examiner requires 
amendment to a species or a specific subgeneric concept, the issued claims are defined, not by 
the applicant, but by the examiner.  As noted in Weber, 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, 
provides that “[t]he specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing 
out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.”145  
Thus, capitulation to the examiner’s requirements denies applicant of his statutory right. 
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Another issue presented by restriction practice is that restrictions are not appealable – 
only petitionable.
146
  Petitions for restriction requirements are made to the Group Director.
147
  
Decisions are highly fact specific and because they are rendered by a variety of individuals can 
result in vast inconsistencies, which go unchecked.  Decisions are difficult to search because 
while entered in a specific patent application, there is no database or repository for them.  Unlike 
appeals and court cases, petition decisions are not published and have no precedential value.  
This lack of transparency can be frustrating.  Further, as Markush claims have become 
increasingly broad and complex, restriction practice has not been able to ease the Patent Office’s 
burdens.
148
 
C. The Proposed Alternative Claims Rules:  An Approach Never Implemented 
In 2007, the Patent Office sought to establish new rules for the examination of Markush-
type claims.
149
  The proposed rules would have fundamentally changed examination practice 
both with regard to how claims are drafted and how they are examined.
150
  The proposed rules 
contained two general provisions:  that each claim must be limited to a single invention and that 
the claims must conform to a simplified format.
151
 
The first provision of the proposed rules provided that each claim must be limited to a 
single invention.
152
  Claims directed to two or more independent and distinct inventions would 
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be subject to an objection
153
 with applicants being required to cancel nonelected subject matter 
from the claim to obtain allowance of the elected invention.
154
  It was the Patent Office’s 
position that restriction between inventions within such a claim is proper under 35 U.S.C. § 
121.
155
  The propriety of such a requirement would be determined “without regard to whether the 
plural inventions are recited in separate claims or as alternatives within a single claim.”156  The 
Patent Office distinguished between a generic claim that does not contain any list of alternatives, 
which was considered drawn to a single invention, and a claim that provides one or more lists of 
alternatives, which is presumptively directed to more than one invention.
157
  The proposed rules 
acknowledged that even where a claim uses alternative language, it is directed to a single 
invention “when at least one of the following two conditions is met: (1) All of the species 
encompassed by the claim share a substantial feature essential for a common utility, or (2) all of 
the species are prima facie obvious over each other.
158
  The first of these conditions is from In re 
Harnisch (actually from Ex parte Hozumi).
 159
  In determining whether a claim meets this 
condition, “common utility” was defined as a utility that complies with 35 U.S.C. § 101,160 and a 
“substantial feature” was defined as “a particular structure, material, or act, without which the 
claimed alternatives would not retain the shared utility.”161  The second of these conditions 
conforms “the long-standing principle that it is improper to restrict between species that are 
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prima facie obvious over each other.”162  If either of these situations exist, restriction would not 
be proper.
163
   
The proposed rule suggested that applicants, sua sponte, provide an explanation as to why 
the claim is directed to a single invention.
164
  Rather naively, the Patent Office’s position was 
that such statements would lessen the number of restriction requirements and expedite 
prosecution.
165
   
The second provision of the proposed rules would have required that applicants use a 
simplified format for claims containing alternative language.
166
  This provision had four 
requirements.  The first two requirements were that “the number and presentation of alternatives 
in the claim not make that claim difficult to construe,”167 and that “each alternative within a list 
of alternatives must be substitutable one for another.” 168   These first two provisions are 
consistent with the “unity of invention” provisions of the PCT Guidelines.169  According to the 
Patent Office, they also are consistent with U.S. practice at the time.
170
  Third, “no alternative 
may itself be defined as a set of further alternatives.”171  This requirement would reduce the 
complexity of the claims.
172
  Fourth, “no alternative may be encompassed by any other 
alternative within a list of alternatives, unless there is no other practical way to define the 
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invention.”173  The proposed rule stated that “[a]pplicants should narrow the scope of protection 
sought via separate claims and not via nested sets of overlapping alternatives.”174  Claims that in 
any way did not meet the simplified format requirements would be subject to objection.
175
  
In response to the proposed rule, several organizations and individual companies 
provided comments.
176
  Although most of the commenters sympathized with the difficulties 
faced by the Patent Office, several did not believe that the proposed rules would achieve the 
Patent Office’s stated purposes.177  In particular, BIO stated that, “The PTO reports that this 
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proposed rule is part of the effort to increase the quality of patents and decrease backlog of 
pending patent applications.  However, allowing Examiners to restrict within a single claim will 
not decrease the number of applications being filed by an applicant.  Rather it will increase the 
number of applications … and add to the growing backlog of unexamined applications at the 
PTO.”178 
Several major concerns were expressed in the comments and are summarized here.  First, 
there was concern that the rules created disparate treatment for those using true generic language 
and those using alternative language.
179
  The rules placed individuals claiming inventions for 
which no generic terms is available at a disadvantage.  BIO expressed concern that the 
biotechnology industry was particularly vulnerable to this disparity.
180
  A second concern was 
that the rules gave the examiners too much authority to define the invention, which by statute is 
applicants purview.
181
  The American Intellectual Property Association (AIPLA) stated that 
“[w]e believe the proposed rules place too much authority in the hands of patent examiners to 
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determine the subject matter that applicants regard as their invention.  The practical application 
of the rules as proposed will effectively permit an examiner to limit the scope of claims to 
subject matter which an examiner believes can be adequately searched.” 182   Third, the 
commenters acknowledged the continuing issues related to written description for subgenuses 
created by examiner,
183
 a problem also recognized by the court in Weber.
184
  Fourth, the 
commenters noted that the requirement that each of the alternatives be substitutable appears to 
focus on interchangeability of alternatives rather than compound as a whole as required by In re 
Jones.
185
 
Many commenters also noted that the “difficult to construe” language of the proposed 
rules is nebulous.
186
  In particular AIPLA argued that “[t]he PTO should continue to rely on 35 
U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, to determine whether a claim is ‘difficult to construe,’ or is 
otherwise unclear. The proposed language would not provide any guidance for either examiners 
or applicants and is capable of many interpretations.  Applicants should be held to the statutory 
standard for clarity, but should not be held to any further nebulous standard that will only detract 
                                                 
182
 AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION COMMENTS (OCTOBER 15, 2007) ON 
EXAMINATION OF PATENT APPLICATIONS THAT INCLUDE CLAIMS CONTAINING ALTERNATIVE 
LANGUAGE, 72 FED. REG. 44,992, 1. 
183
 See, e.g., BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION COMMENTS (OCTOBER 9, 2007) ON 
EXAMINATION OF PATENT APPLICATIONS THAT INCLUDE CLAIMS CONTAINING ALTERNATIVE 
LANGUAGE, 72 FED. REG. 44,992, 4.  
184
 In re Weber, 580 F.2d 455, 458 (C.C.P.A. 1978). 
185
 See, e.g., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNERS ORGANIZATION COMMENTS (OCTOBER 15, 2007) 
ON EXAMINATION OF PATENT APPLICATIONS THAT INCLUDE CLAIMS CONTAINING ALTERNATIVE 
LANGUAGE, 72 FED. REG. 44,992, 3. 
186
 See, e.g., AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION COMMENTS (OCTOBER 15, 
2007) ON EXAMINATION OF PATENT APPLICATIONS THAT INCLUDE CLAIMS CONTAINING 
ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE, 72 FED. REG. 44,992, 1; BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION 
COMMENTS (OCTOBER 9, 2007) ON EXAMINATION OF PATENT APPLICATIONS THAT INCLUDE 
CLAIMS CONTAINING ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE, 72 FED. REG. 44,992, 3; INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY OWNERS ORGANIZATION COMMENTS (OCTOBER 15, 2007) ON EXAMINATION OF 
PATENT APPLICATIONS THAT INCLUDE CLAIMS CONTAINING ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE, 72 FED. 
REG. 44,992, 2. 
  27 
attention away from the objective of determining patentability.”187   
It was also noted that several of the provisions would circumvent the appeals process by 
allowing examiners to restrict where they otherwise would be required to reject the claims.
 188
  
For example, the standard for “common utility” is said to be that of § 101.189  If the examiner 
does not believe all of the compounds meet the utility requirement of § 101, he could simply 
restrict the claims, and applicant would never be able to challenge the underlying utility 
rejection.  Similarly, if the examiner finds the claims difficult to construe and restricts, applicant 
would never be able to challenge the underlying § 112, second paragraph rejection.  The 
proposed rules state that “where an elected species is patentable, but the claims are not enabled 
or adequately described over their entire scope, the proposed rule would permit an examiner to 
require restriction of the claims to the elected species and allowable variants thereof,” 190 
forestalling any challenge by applicant regarding the propriety of the underlying § 112, first 
paragraph rejection.
191
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D. Markush Practice under the Supplementary Guidelines:  A New/Old Approach 
1.  The Guidelines 
In February 2011, the Patent Office issued “Supplementary Examination Guidelines for 
Determining Compliance with 35 U.S.C. 112 and for Treatment of Related Issues in Patent 
Applications.” 192   The Guidelines became effective February 9, 2011, and apply to all 
applications.
193
  One of the Patent Office’s stated purposes is to optimize patent quality by 
providing clear notice as to the metes and bounds of the claims.
194
  Another stated purpose is “to 
assist United States Patent and Trademark Office personnel in the examination of claims in 
patent applications for compliance with 35 U.S.C. 112, second paragraph.”195  The Guidelines 
are not substantive rulemaking.  Instead, the Patent Office indicates that the Guidelines “relate 
only to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency, organization, 
procedure or practice”196 and are intended to “merely update USPTO examination practice for 
consistency with the USPTO’s current understanding of the case law regarding the requirements 
of 35 U.S.C. 112.”197   
The Guidelines discuss a number of different issues, including examination of Markush 
claims.
198
  A Markush claim is defined as one that “recites a list of alternatively useable 
species.”199  The Guidelines indicate that two rejections may be appropriate upon examination of 
a Markush claim:  a rejection for indefiniteness under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, and a 
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rejection under the supposed judicial doctrine of improper Markush grouping.
200
  The Patent 
Office acknowledges that while Markush claims, “may encompass a large number of alternative 
species,” breadth is not necessarily indefiniteness.201  However, the Guidelines indicate that, “a 
Markush group may be so expansive that persons skilled in the art cannot determine the metes 
and bounds of the claimed invention.  For example, a Markush group that encompasses a 
massive number of distinct alternative species may be indefinite under § 112, ¶2 if one skilled in 
the art cannot determine the metes and bounds of the claim due to an inability to envision all of 
the members of the Markush group.”202  In such circumstances, the examiner is directed to reject 
the claims as indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph.
203
  Further, examiners are 
instructed to reject the claims under “the judicially approved ‘improper Markush grouping’ 
doctrine when the claim contains an improper grouping of alternatively useable species.
204
  A 
Markush claim contains an ‘improper Markush grouping’ if: (1) the species of the Markush 
group do not share a ‘single structural similarity,’ or (2) the species do not share a common 
use.”205  The Guidelines state that “[m]embers of a Markush group share a ‘single structural 
similarity’ when they belong to the same recognized physical or chemical class or to the same 
art-recognized class.”206  They share a common use “when they are disclosed in the specification 
or known in the art to be functionally equivalent.”207  The Guidelines instruct the examiner to 
maintain the improper Markush rejection until “the claim is amended to include only the species 
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that share a single structural similarity and a common use, or the applicant presents a sufficient 
showing that the species in fact share a single structural similarity and a common use.”208 
The Guidelines continue to support current Patent Office restriction procedures in which 
applicant is required to elect a single species or group of indistinct species, with one 
exception.
209
  Instead of indicating the examiner should extend search and examination to 
determine patentability of the generic claim, the Guidelines provide that the examiner should 
extend the search to those additional species that “share a single structural similarity and a 
common use with the elected species.”210 
2.  Ex parte DeGrado – Looking for Validation of the Guidelines 
The Guidelines are a radical change from the longstanding restriction practice, and the 
Patent Office appears eager to test them in the court system.  In May 2011, the Board of Patent 
Appeals and Interferences (BPAI) sua sponte ordered further briefing on issues under the 
Guidelines that were not before it in the appeal.
211
   
The DeGrado application claims a method for treating microbial infections by 
administering compositions that include an amphiphilic oligomer.
212
  The oligomers are claimed 
in Markush format.
213
  The claims are quite broad, with the BPAI estimating that they encompass 
“in excess of 400 billion oligomers.”214  During prosecution of the application, the examiner 
issued several restriction requirements, including a requirement for election of a single disclosed 
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species, which resulted in examination of a subset of the originally presented claims.
215
  These 
restriction requirements were made prior to issuance of the current Guidelines. 
At the close of prosecution, only one issue remained for appeal – a rejection of the 
examined claims under the judicially created doctrine of obviousness-type double patenting over 
a previously issued patent.
216
  DeGrado appealed the examiner’s rejection, and both the Appeal 
Brief and the Examiner’s Answer dealt only with this issue.217  Then, on May 9, 2011, the BPAI 
issued an Order for Further Briefing, requiring under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(d),
218
 that applicants 
brief two issues not before it on appeal: 
1.  Whether applicants may be required to restrict their claims to a single invention under 
the provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 121; and 
2.  Whether Claim 16 is a proper “Markush Claim.”219 
The Patent Office has long held the viewpoint that 35 U.S.C. § 121,
220
 which states, “[i]f 
two or more independent and distinct inventions are claimed in one application, the Director may 
require the application to be restricted to one of the inventions”221 includes restriction within a 
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single claim where the claim contains “two or more independent and distinct inventions.”222  In 
re Weber makes clear, however, that there is a difference between restricting between claims in 
an application and restricting within a single claim of an application,
223
 the first being 
permissible, the second not being permissible.  The board required applicants to brief what it 
views as a conflict between the statute and the court’s holding in Weber.224  The board also 
required applicants to address whether the language of § 112, second paragraph, requiring “one 
or more claims … claiming the subject matter the applicant regards as his invention” 225 
necessarily prevents the Director from requiring “the application to be restricted to one of the 
inventions”226 when more than one independent and distinct invention is encompassed within a 
single claim.
227
   
This issue has long been contested between the Patent Office and the patent bar.  The 
Patent Office has often argued that 35 US.C. § 121 authorizes restriction within a single claim 
where that claim contains two or more independent and distinct inventions.
228
  In contrast, the 
patent bar has argued that under the CCPA decisions in Weber and Haas interpreting § 121 and § 
112, the Patent Office is prohibited from restricting within a single claim.
229
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The CCPA’s decision in Harnisch refocused the discussion of Markush practice to one of 
“unity of invention.”230  The Patent Office has long held the viewpoint that Harnisch established 
the test for determining whether a Markush claim is or is not proper on the basis of whether it 
has or lacks “unity of invention.”231  According to the Patent Office, “[a] Markush claim is 
improper if the inventions (1) do not share a common use; or (2) do not share a ‘single structural 
similarity,’ that is, a substantial structure feature disclosed as being essential to the common 
utility.”232  DeGrado’s independent claim recites a large number of oligomers, all of which are 
amphiphilic.
233
   The board required DeGrado “to brief whether the recitation of a broad general 
formula covering a very large group of compounds, the recitation of a general chemical property 
(amphiphilicity) that may be possessed by those compounds, and the recitation of a single broad 
step of ‘administering an effective amount’ is per se sufficient to create ‘unity of invention’ as 
that concept was used by the Harnisch court.”234  The board further required applicants to brief 
whether the compounds encompassed by the independent claim “share any additional structural 
or functional features that would establish unity of invention.”235 
This issue also has long been contested between the Patent Office and the patent bar.  The 
Patent Office has consistently argued that under Harnisch, to have “unity of invention,” a 
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Markush group must possess a common structural feature that is essential to its utility.
236
  The 
patent bar has argued that this requirement is not found in the Harnisch decision.  The bar argues 
that Harnisch only requires a common structural feature and a common utility, not that the 
common structural feature give rise to, or be essential for, the common utility.
237
  As noted by 
the patent bar, the Patent Office’s long subscribed language can be found nowhere in the 
Harnisch decision.
238
  In fact, it appears that this standard was actually introduced in Ex parte 
Hozumi, based on its interpretation of the Harnisch decision.
239
 
Applicant’s brief in response to the board’s order provides an excellent discussion of the 
law related to the Markush issues raised by the board.  As an initial matter, the brief asserts that 
the board has no jurisdiction to decide the specific issues it raised.
240
  First, it is clear that 
disputes involving restriction requirements are not appealable; instead they are petitionable to the 
Director.
241
  Thus, the board has no jurisdiction over disputes related to restriction practice.  
Second, even if a determination of such disputes were within the jurisdiction of the board, no 
such dispute was at issue in the application.
242
  Although during prosecution of the application, 
applicant argued the propriety of various aspects of the restriction requirements raised by the 
examiner, he acquiesced to the final restriction requirement long before appeal without even 
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filing a petition.
243
  Third, 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(d),
244
 only authorizes the board to order additional 
briefing on matters that could assist the board in reaching decision on the pending appeal.
245
  The 
only issue properly before the board is the obviousness-type double patenting rejection.
246
  The 
two issues for which briefing were ordered have no bearing on the double patenting issue.  That 
the board would require briefing on issues not raised in prosecution and not properly within its 
jurisdiction is a clear indication of the Patent Office’s desire to advance its position and perhaps 
have the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit consider the Patent Office’s new practice 
under the Guidelines.
247
 
DeGrado has advanced arguments similar to those expressed by the patent bar for years.  
He argues that Weber and Haas were correctly decided and do not conflict with 35 U.S.C. § 121 
because language of § 121 does not provide a basis for the Patent Office to restrict within a 
single claim nor to reject a claim.
248
  Weber confirms that restriction is only proper where there 
are two or more independent and distinct inventions.
249
  DeGrado urges that, “[a] single claim 
cannot be considered ‘two or more independent and distinct inventions’ because the claim is the 
invention, as determined by the inventors.”250 
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DeGrado further argues that 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, does not give the Patent 
Office discretion to require restriction within a single claim.
251
  Rather, it “gives the applicant the 
sole right to define the invention.”252  DeGrado provided a review of the relevant parts of the 
Weber decision, noting that Weber confirmed that it is applicant’s statutory right to define what 
he, not the examiner, regards as the invention and to have “each claim examined on the 
merits.”253  
With regard to the Markush questions raised by the board, DeGrado argues first that there 
is no statutory basis for rejecting the claims as being an improper Markush grouping.
254
  This 
fact does not seem to be in dispute.  Since the decisions in Weber and Haas holding that rejection 
under § 121 was improper, the Patent Office has not asserted that it had statutory authority to 
reject such claims.  DeGrado, however, appears to advance a more fundamental question: if the 
Patent Office is prohibited from rejecting a claim under § 121, can it circumvent that prohibition 
by rejecting the claim as encompassing an improper Markush group.
255
  In Harnisch and 
Hozumi, the claims were held to constitute proper Markush groups, and so the propriety of an 
“improper Markush” rejection was not addressed.  However, the courts permit the Patent Office 
to make other types of non-statutory rejections, such as the obviousness-type double patenting 
rejection actually at issue in this case.
256
  Therefore, it is not inconceivable that the courts would 
permit the Patent Office to make such a rejection on appropriate facts. 
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DeGrado further asserts that “there is no per se rule governing unity of invention.”257  
While the Patent Office generally applies the test from Harnisch, or more accurately Hozumi, 
there may be other ways in which to establish unity of invention.  That said, DeGrado argues that 
the invention on appeal demonstrates unity of invention under the Harnisch and Hozumi tests as 
well as the somewhat different test applied under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT).
258
  His 
arguments focus on the Patent Office’s obligation to examine a claim, regardless of breath, if it 
has unity of invention.
259
  DeGrado argues that, “[t]he breadth of the formula and the number of 
compounds are not relevant to deciding whether a Markush claim is proper.”260  He cites to 
Judge Rich’s concurrence in Weber, indicating that there is “no excuse at all for refusing to 
examine a broad generic claim – no matter how broad, which means no matter how many 
independently patentable inventions may fall within it.”261  Since the Patent Office’s main reason 
for restricting or rejecting Markush-type claims has been to manage resources and examiner 
workflow,
262
 a decision that broad claims, such as those at issue in this case, possess unity of 
invention and therefore must be examined in their entirety would place a significant burden on 
the Patent Office and likely result in increased pendency within Technology Center 1600. 
III. The Future of Markush Practice under the Guidelines 
The Guidelines were published to assist examiners and practitioners with examination 
issues under 35 U.S.C. § 112, in particular with all sections of § 112 except first paragraph, 
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which is covered in the Patent Office’s Enablement263 and Written Description264 guidelines and 
corresponding training materials.
265
  The Guidelines shift the focus of Markush practice from 
restriction to a combination of restriction and rejection of the claims.
266
   
While the Guidelines still include restriction of Markush claims in the form of election of 
species practice,
267
 they now instruct the examiner to consider two possible claim rejections.
268
  
The first of these rejections is the “improper Markush” rejection. 269   The second of is an 
indefiniteness rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph.
270
  One result of this shift is 
that the Patent Office has revised its election of species practice.
271
  Where the examiner does not 
find the elected species, he is only required to extend search and examination to those 
compounds he considers to fall within a proper Markush group
272
 rather than the previous 
practice of extending the search to the extent required to determine patentability of the claim.
273
  
Another result of this shift is that the examiner’s rejections of the claims are appealable, 
providing applicant with two avenues to challenge the Patent Office’s position – petition of the 
election of species requirement and appeal of the improper Markush rejection.  Any rejection 
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under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph also is appealable.
274
  As examiners begin applying the 
Guidelines, it can be expected in certain circumstances applicants will appeal the rejections.  
The Patent Office has long based its justification for restricting and/or rejecting a 
Markush-type claim on the basis that the claim contains independent and distinct inventions.
275
  
The court in Harnisch characterized this concept as “unity of invention.”276  Where a claim 
contains independent and distinct inventions, it is said to lack unity of invention.  The Guidelines 
allow examiners to restrict and reject claims where the lack unity of invention. 
Although there are likely to be challenges under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph, the 
following discussion focuses on challenges related to improper Markush rejections.  One such 
challenge will likely be whether the language of the test established in Harnisch is the only test 
for determining unity of invention.  The courts will likely hold that there is no single test for 
determining whether unity exists or whether a Markush grouping is proper and that each case 
must be considered on its own facts. 
In two recent cases, not relating to Markush practice, the Supreme Court held that tests 
established by the Federal Circuit were not exclusive.
277
  The first of these cases was KSR Int'l 
Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.
278
 decided in 2007.  KSR dealt with the Federal Circuit’s longstanding test 
for evaluating the obviousness of patent claims known as the teaching-suggestion-motivation 
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(TSM) test “under which a patent claim is only proved obvious if ‘some motivation or 
suggestion to combine the prior art teachings’ can be found in the prior art the nature of the 
problem, or the knowledge of a person having ordinary skill in the art.
279
  The Supreme Court 
rejected the Federal Circuit’s application of the TSM test as too rigid an approach.280  The Court 
held that its precedent established that the analysis for considering obviousness should be 
flexible and encompass more than one approach.
281
  Similarly, in 2010, the Supreme Court found 
the Federal Circuit’s “machine or transformation test” for determining the patent eligibility of a 
process to be only one of several possible tests for determining patent eligible subject matter.
282
  
An en banc panel of the Federal Circuit held that the only proper test for determining whether a 
process was directed to patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 was the machine or 
transformation test “under which a process is directed to patentable subject matter if (1) it is tied 
to a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different state 
or thing.”283  It found Bilski’s claims did not meet the test.284  The Supreme Court upheld the 
Federal Circuit’s judgment, but held that while the machine-or-transformation test is an 
important test for determining patent eligibility, it is not the exclusive test. 
285
  Based on these 
decisions, it is likely courts will find that there is no single test for determining whether a claim 
lacks unity or is a proper Markush claim.  Even in Harnisch, the court held that each case had to 
be considered on its own facts.
286
 
                                                 
279
 Id. at 407 (citing Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int'l, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1323-1324 (CA Fed. 1999)). 
280
 Id. at 415. 
281
 See, Id. at 415. 
282
 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
283
 Id. at 3220. 
284
 Id. 
285
 Id. at 3259. 
286
 In re Harnisch, 631 F.2d 716, 722 (C.C.P.A. 1980). 
  41 
In Harnisch, the claims were found to have unity of invention.  All of the claimed 
compounds were all useful for the same purpose and all had a single structural similarity.
287
  The 
court found this adequate to constitute a proper Markush group.
288
  The board in Hozumi used a 
more stringent test, requiring that the claims have a common functional utility and a substantial, 
structural feature that is essential for that utility.
289
  Both tests could be appropriate under 
particular factual circumstances.   
Another test the court may find useful for determining unity of invention is the PCT 
test.
290
  Under the PCT Guidelines,
291
 where an application contains more than one invention, the 
inventions must be linked to form a general inventive concept.
292
  Inventions have such a general 
inventive concept when they contain a “special technical feature” that defines over the prior 
art.
293
  In evaluating unity of invention, the international searching authority first considers the 
claims on their face, before any search is performed.
294
  If it is clear that the inventions have no 
technical feature in common, unity is lacking.
295
  This is akin to the U.S. concept of independent 
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293
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294
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inventions.  If, however, the inventions appear to be linked by a common technical feature, a 
search is performed.  The results of such a search may indicate that the common technical feature 
does not define over the prior art, in such case the claims are considered to lack unity.
296
  This is 
akin to the U.S. concept of distinct inventions.  Adopting a PCT-like standard has been urged in 
the past to promote global harmonization.
297
  However, it is not clear that such a standard is 
workable in the U.S.  The U.S. standard of obviousness is based on structural similarity 
providing similar function, while the PCT lack of inventive step standard is based on a problem-
solution approach.
298
  Further, the special technical feature analysis focuses on the similarity of a 
particular part of the molecule and how it is different from the prior art.
299
  This is directly 
contrary to CCPA precedent that requires consideration of the claimed compounds as a whole.
300
 
Another standard for unity of invention could follow a typical obviousness analysis.  The 
Patent Office asserts that a Markush-type claim is directed to independent and distinct inventions 
where “two or more of its members are so unrelated and diverse that a prior art reference 
anticipating the claim with respect to one of the members would not render the claim obvious 
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under 35 U.S.C. 103 with respect to the other member(s).”301  Thus, if members of a Markush 
group would render one another obvious, they should be found to have unity of invention.  The 
Patent Office said as much in is 2007 proposed rules, discussed supra in § II-C.
302
  M.P.E.P. § 
2144.09 states that, “a prima facie case of obviousness may be made when chemical compounds 
have very close structural similarities and similar utilities.” 303   Thus, if the compounds are 
sufficiently close in structure for the examiner to make an obviousness rejection, then no lack of 
unity should be found absent a clear indication on the record that different compounds in the 
claim have different utilities. 
As rejections are challenged, creative patent attorneys and judges are likely to develop 
additional tests for determination of unity.  This will initially lead to more confusion, increased 
prosecution, and delays in obtaining protection due to the appeal process.  However, as court 
decisions begin to establish precedent, applicants and examiners alike will gain clarity and be 
able to determine what standards should apply to individual claims.  That said, an appellate 
approach is not a quick fix and will not reduce claim complexity or decrease pendency, two of 
the Patent Office’s goals in establishing procedures for addressing Markush claims,304 in the 
short term.   
                                                 
301
 M.P.E.P. § 803.02 (8
th
 ed., Rev. 5, Aug. 2006). 
302
 Examination of Patent Applications that Include Claims Containing Alternative Language, 72 
Fed. Reg. 44,992, 44,997 (proposed August 10, 2007, never enacted). 
303
 M.P.E.P. § 2144.09 (8
th
 ed., Rev. 6, Sept. 2007).  A prima facie case of obviousness may be 
made when chemical compounds have very close structural similarities and similar utilities. “An 
obviousness rejection based on similarity in chemical structure and function entails the 
motivation of one skilled in the art to make a claimed compound, in the expectation that 
compounds similar in structure will have similar properties.” In re Payne, 606 F.2d 303, 313, 
203 USPQ 245, 254 (CCPA 1979). 
304
 Examination of Patent Applications that Include Claims Containing Alternative Language, 72 
Fed. Reg. at 44,992 (proposed August 10, 2007, never enacted). 
  44 
To the extent that the standard set out in the Guidelines for determining whether a 
Markush group is improper is confirmed, there are likely to be further challenges regarding what 
constitutes a single structural similarity and what is necessary for a common use.  The Guidelines 
state that “[m]embers of a Markush group share a ‘single structural similarity’ when they belong 
to the same recognized physical or chemical class or to the same art-recognized class.”305  This is 
consistent with case law.
306
  However, disputes are likely to arise over whether a specific group 
of compounds belong to the same class, and it remains to be seen whether nearly thirty years 
after Harnisch, the courts would apply the same standard. 
The Guidelines further state that members of a Markush group share a common use 
“when they are disclosed in the specification or known in the art to be functionally 
equivalent.”307  Disputes also are likely to arise over what is meant by functionally equivalent.  
One standard that might be applied by the courts is the utility standard of § 101 as urged by the 
Patent Office in its 2007 Proposed Rules.
308
  Another standard may be a simple class of use test, 
i.e. all of the compounds are dyes or all are catalysts for the same type of reaction.  To that end, 
it is not clear whether compounds having a common mechanism of action will be considered 
functionally equivalent, or if compounds having the same type but different degrees of activity 
would be functionally equivalent. 
IV. Summary 
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Examination of Markush and other alternative claims has been a difficulty for the Patent 
Office as far back as Ex parte Eagle.
309
  As more complex technologies have emerged, so too 
have patent claims become more complex.  At the same time, the Patent Office is facing a huge 
backlog of applications and ever-increasing pendency.
310
   
In the past, the Patent Office has adopted or proposed various approaches to improve the 
volume and complexity of applications faced by examiners.
311
  To date none have been 
particularly successful.  The new Guidelines show promise in part because they attempt to meet 
the tests laid out by the court in previous Markush cases
312
 and in part because they address the 
concerns of applicants to appeal such decisions to the judicial system. 
It is doubtful that the Guidelines will have much impact in reducing pendency in the near 
term.  However, over time they should result in improved examination and clarity for both the 
examiners and applicants as to the scope and content of Markush-type claims. 
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